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Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries
By DERMOT LEAHY AND J. PETER NEARY *
We consider the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a general oligopoly
model with many firms which fir.st engage in R&D and then compete in either
output or price. Strategic behavior by firms tends to reduce output, R&D, and
welfare and so justifies higher subsidies except when R&D spillovers are low and
firms' actions are strategic substitutes. It also reduces the benefits of R&D co-
operation. Moreover, policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redun-
dant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the
welfare cost of lax competition policy is high. (JEL D43, L13, 032)
The importance of determining optimal pol-
icy towards R&D cannot be exaggerated,
given the worldwide interest in fostering R&D
and given the significant differences between
European and U.S. policies towards interfirm
cooperation on R&D.' Moreover, the problem
is an inherently difficult one because of the
complex nature of the R&D process. Since
R&D is a component of fixed costs, industries
where it is important tend to be concentrated.
Hence R&D policy must go hand in hand with
competition policy. At the same time, R&D is
like any form of investment in that it precedes
the production stage. Hence, issues of time
consistency and strategic commitment inevi-
tably arise in considering the choice of R&D
policy. Finally, R&D by one firm typically
leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms,
so that R&D exhibits many of the character-
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istics of a public good, albeit one that is mostly
privately produced. Tbe degree to which such
spillovers occur and can be internalized is an-
other crucial influence on the desirable pattem
of intervention.
All tbese aspects of R&D generate incentives
for firms to bebave strategically, but, as previ-
ous writers have shown, the effects of such in-
centives are ambiguous. James A, Brander and
Barbara J. Spencer {1983) sbowed that oligop-
olistic firms which invested strategically in
R&D, with a view to improving their ftiture
competitive position vis-a-vis their rivals,
would normally carry out more R&D than the
cost-minimizing level. In this respect, the stra-
tegic incentives to which R&D give rise are
identical to those arising from investment in
physical capital, as considered for example by
A, Micbael Spence ( 1977), Avinash Dixit
(1980), and Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole
(1984). However, Brander and Spencer did not
allow for any R&D spillovers between firms.
Spence (1984) focused on this issue and noted
that such spillovers dilute the strategic incentive
for firms to engage in R&D (because each firm
is adversely affected by tbe positive benefits
which its own R&D confers on its rivals).
Spence suggested that cooperation on R&D
might internalize this negative externality,
though he did not present a complete analysis.
It was left to Claude d'Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) to formalize this argument,
and to show that, with sufficiently large spill-
overs, cooperation on R&D (though with sub-
sequent competition at tbe output stage) indeed
leads to more output, R&D, and welfare.
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These papers and the hterature they have
inspired have thrown considerable hght on as-
pects of R&D in oligopolistic markets.^ Nev-
ertheless, there remain a numher of issues
which require further exploration and which
form the subject of this paper. The first of these
is the need to disentangle the separate influ-
ences of strategic behavior on the one hand
and R&D cooperation on the other. Whereas
Brander-Spencer and Spence compare strate-
gic and nonstrategic behavior in the absence
of cooperation, d'Aspremont-Jacquemin and
subsequent writers take strategic behavior for
granted and concentrate on comparing the out-
comes with and without R&D cooperation.
Each of these approaches is incomplete and,
as we shall see, potentially misleading. The
first objective of this paper, therefore, is to
present a comprehensive analysis of these is-
sues in a generalization of the d'Aspremont
and Jacquemin model of two-stage duopoly
which allows for nonlinear demands, price as
well as quantity competition, and many firms.
By focusing on the incentives to engage in
R&D, by invoking stability conditions in a nat-
ural way, and by making use of a new geo-
metric technique, we are able to give a more
comprehensive ranking of output, R&D, and
welfare in the different cases.
A ranking of welfare levels is essential if they
are to be evaluated from a public policy per-
spective. However, it is not sufficient as a guide
to whether intervention is desirable or not. To
determine this, it is also necessary to examine
which of the equilibria will be chosen in the ab-
sence of intervention. In this context, the second
objective of this paper is to compare the levels
^ Irene Henriques (1990) considers the stability of the
d'Aspremonl-Jacquemin model and Raymond De Bondt
et al. (1992) and Morton I. Kamien et al. (1992) extend
it to allow for differentiated products and price as well as
quantity competition. Kotaro Suzumura( 1992) allows for
many firms and general demands in Coumot competition,
as does Steffen Ziss (1994), who independently derives a
diagram similar to ours. Relative lo these papers, we make
a number of contributions: we allow for general functional
forms in both output and price competition; we calculate
explicit expressions for the marginal retum to R&D in
each equilibrium; we disentangle the separale influences
of R&D cooperation and strategic behavior; we consider
industry profits; and we derive explicit expressions for the
optimal subsidies.
of industry profits in the different equilibria. This
allows in particular an investigafion of the mar-
ket incentives for firms to engage in R&D co-
operation without any intervention.
Finally, the third objective of the paper is to
consider explicitly the nature of optimal inter-
vention in each equilibrium. While most pre-
vious papers have had a public policy focus,
they have not attempted to characterize explic-
itly the optimal package. We do this both for
the first-best case, when both output and R&D
subsidies are chosen optimally, and for the
second-best case, when only R&D subsidies are
available. We also address the problem of
dynamic consistency which arises in the first-
best case. If output subsidies are positively in-
fluenced by investment in R&D, and if the
government cannot commit in advance to a sub-
sidy rate, then firms have a further incentive to
invest in R&D. Anticipating this strategic be-
havior, the government, in turn, has an incen-
tive to offer a lower subsidy, just as strategic
behavior by firms enjoying leaming by doing
was shown in Leahy and Neary {1994) to jus-
tify lower, rather than higher, subsidies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section
I introduces the model and Section II considers
the free-market outcome, isolating the separate
influences of strategic behavior and R&D co-
operation. Section III then shows how the first-
best outcome can be attained by appropriate
R&D and output subsidies, under different as-
sumptions about the extent of commitment and
cooperation. Section IV turns to the case
where the government can only use R&D sub-
sidies and considers the optimal second-best
subsidies in this case. Section V looks at ex-
plicit solutions of the model for particular
functional forms and considers the robustness
of the conclusions to the relaxation of a key
assumption. Finally, Section VI concludes
with a summary of results.
I. The Model
We consider an industry of n identical firms,
which compete over two periods. In the first,
preproduction, period, each firm chooses its
level of R&D. x,; while in the second period,
it chooses the level of an "action" a,, which
may be either output, q,. or price /?,. This gen-
eral specification encompasses both output
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(Coumot) and price (Bertrand) competition.
Since we consider only symmetric equilibria
in pure strategies, we assume that in Bertrand
competition products are symmetrically dif-
ferentiated across firms.
We assume that marginal production costs
are independent of output but decreasing in
R&D, both that of the firm itself and (through
spillover effects) of its rivals:
(1) c, =
where X.^ is the total R&D carried out by all
n - 1 firms other than firm i. We define:
(2) i >0,
as the direct cost-reducing effect of R&D per
unit output; and
(3)
^ / 3 < 1,
as the spillover coefficient, measuring (as a
fraction of ^) the extent to which firm i ben-
efits from R&D carried out by any other firm.
The terms 9 and (3 need not be constant, but
we will focus on symmetric equilibria in
which they are common across all firms.^ Fi-
nally, we define:
(4)
This shows the effect on each firm's marginal
cost of a unit increase in R&D by all firms. In
symmetric equilibria, this can be interpreted as
the marginal social retum to R&D per unit
output.
Each firm's profits may be written as
follows:
(5) 7r' =
- r , { j t , ) -I- axi -I- 5 ' ( < 3 ; , A _ , , s).
' De Bondt and Irene Henriques (1995) consider asym-
metric R&D spillovers. Stephen W. Salant and Greg Shaffer
(1996) show that even ex ante identical firms may have in-
centives to make unequal investments in R&D. We assume
a sufficiently low S that this possibility may be ignored.
R' denotes the firm's net revenue from pro-
duction and sales, which depends on its unit
production costs and on its own and other
firms' actions in the second period. (A_, de-
notes the vector of actions by all firms other
than firm i.) In addition, the firm incurs R&D
costs r, (x,), and it receives subsidies. We de-
note by a and 5 the per unit subsidies to R&D
and output, respectively. Subsidy revenue in
the second period is denoted by S' which
equals .va, in Coumot competition and sqt (a,,
A_,) in Bertrand competition.
In specifying firm behavior, there are two
further issues to be considered, the degree of
cooperation and the order of moves. Concem-
ing the former, we are mainly interested in the
implications of R&D cooperation, by which
we mean that each firm chooses its R&D in
order to maximize industry profits. We there-
fore contrast the cases where firms either do
or do not cooperate on their levels of R&D,
assuming that they choose their second-period
actions in a noncooperative fashion. For ref-
erence we also consider the cartel case, where
both R&D and output levels are chosen
cooperatively.
As for move order, the decisions on R&D
and on output or price have a natural temporal
sequence. However, firms may or may not be
able to commit to their second-period actions
at the same time as they choose their R&D;
and the govemment may or may not be able
to commit to both subsidies in advance of
firms' decisions. We assume that the govem-
ment can always commit intratemporally: it
can set the level of each period's subsidy {to
R&D in period 1 and to output in period 2)
before firms choose the corresponding vari-
able. As in Leahy and Neary (1994), this
leaves three altemative assumptions about the
degree of intertemporal commitment, each im-
plying a different order of moves:
1. Full Commitment Equilibrium (FCE). In
this case, the game has two stages. In the
first stage the govemment chooses both
subsidies and in the second stage the firms
choose simultaneously their R&D levels
and their second-period actions.
2. Government-Only Commitment Equilib-
rium (GCE). This game has three stages.
As in FCE, the govemment first chooses
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both subsidies. Firms iheTi choose their
R&D levels at the second stage and their
second-period actions at the third stage.
3. Sequence Equilibrium (SE). In this four-
stage game, no intertemporal commitment
is possible. The govemmeTit chooses its
R&D subsidy a; each firm then chooses its
R&D level; next the govemment chooses
its output subsidy s; and finally each firm
chooses its second-period action.
We assume subgame perfection throughout,
so at each stage each agent anticipates how its
actions will influence the actions of all other
agents at every future stage. Hence, the dif-
ferences between the three assumptions about
move order reflect differences in the con-
straints, institutional or other, on agents'
ability to commit to future actions. Since
under each assumption firms may or may not
cooperate on R&D, we have a total of six
combinations to be considered. Following
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), we use the term
"strategic behavior'' to refer to investments in
R&D carried out by firms in GCE and SE with
a view to affecting the environment in which
the second-period game is played. (Of course,
the firms are always Nash players so, strictly
speaking, strategic considerations arise even in
FCE.) In the next section, we examine the free-
market outcome, where the govemment com-
mits to zero subsidies in both periods (so the
FCE and GCE cases effectively reduce to one-
and two-stage games, respectively.)
IL Equilibria Without Government Intervention
A. Second-Period Competition
In oligopoly equilibria, each firm's first-
order condition in period 2 is independent of
the degree of R&D cooperation and the order
of moves, and sets equal to zero the partial
derivative of its profit f"unction with respect to
its own action: IT ; = 0.'' The second-order con-
•" In the absence of subsidies, IT', = R',. so profit-
funclion derivatives could be replaced by revenue-
function derivatives throughout this section. However, it
is more convenient to work with the former since they also
apply in later sections when subsidies are in force. This
dition requires that TT]^ < 0; while the cross
derivative TT'^J (which measures the effect of a
unit increase in firmy's action on the marginal
profitability of firm /) is negative if actions are
strategic substitutes and positive if they are
strategic complements. We will use the term
"normal" Coumot competition for the case
where outputs are strategic substitutes and
"normal" Bertrand competition for that
where prices are strategic complements. And
we assume that the own effect dominates the
cross effect:
ASSUMPTION 1: TT;, - Tr;^  < 0.
Assumption I must hold in Coumot competi-
tion with homogeneous products (since n'^ —
n',j = p' < 0, where p' is the slope of the
inverse demand function) and whenever ac-
tions are strategic complements, including
normal Bertrand competition (since -K'ij > 0).
Additional restrictions are implied by sta-
bility. We show in the Appendix that:
LEMMA 1: The symmetric game in second-
period actions is stable if, and only if:
(6) ( n - 0.
This result can be used to illustrate the sym-
metric equilibrium graphically, in a space
whose coordinates are the period-2 action and
the level of R&D of the typical firm. Totally
differentiating the first-order condition, its
slope is shown in the Appendix to be:
(7) T T ^ A ^ " '
where qa = dqjda, is positive (equal to one)
in Coumot competition and negative (equal to
dqildpi) in Bertrand competition. So, to sign
(7) , we need only make the following
assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2: The stability condition
given in Lemma 7, A > 0, holds at every point
distinetion is particularly important in the case of Bertrand
competition, since output subsidies imply that i^', = R', +
S\ = R\ + sdq./dp,.
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FIGURE 1. COURNOT COMPETIKGN WITH LOW
R&D SPILLOVERS
FIGURE 2. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH HIGH
R&D SPILLOVERS
along HH, the locus representing the period-^
2 equilibrium condition, TT [ = 0.
Given Assumption 2, the locus of {a, x) com-
binations satisfying the period-2 first-order
condition is upward sloping in Coumot com-
petition and downward sloping in Bertrand
competition, as illustrated by the HH sched-
ules in Figures 1 to 3. In all cases, higher R&D
by the representative firm is associated with
higher output.
B. Effects of Strategic Behavior Without
R&D Cooperation
Consider next the firms' choice of R&D.
The simplest case is that of "No-Cooperation
FCE": firms neither cooperate on R&D nor
behave strategically. The level of R&D is then
chosen by setting its marginal private retum
equal to its marginal cost:
(8)
V/;
{Firm subscripts can be omitted in symmetric
equilibria.) In this case, the marginal private
retum to R&D per unit output, which we write
as/i/^ (for "No-Cooperation FCE"), is simply
the reduction in the firm's own unit costs, 6.
By contrast, if firms behave strategically (so
equilibrium is GCE rather than FCE), they
also take account of how their R&D affects
the period-2 choices of other firms:
(9) dn'dx,
_ dn —. dix da; d-n
dx da dx dx
V/,
where 7r; = d-K'/da,. As we show in the Ap-
pendix, the strategic effect on profits is:
(10) 'j^
(11) where: a = —
T,-,- - 7r,y)A
> 0
= ^ < 1.
Since a is positive in both output and price
competition, the sign of (10) depends only on
whethej 0 is greater or less than the threshold
value 0. Summarizing:
LEMMA 2: In a symmetric equilibrium, the
strategic effect of an increase in the R&D of
one firm on its own profits is positive if, and
only if, the spillover coefficient 0 is less than
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FIGURE 3. BERTRAND COMPETITION
(NOT DRAWN ) LIES TO THE LEFT OF A"*"' HOR LOW
SPILLOVERS AND TO ITS RIGHT OTHH.RWISE]
0. This threshold value is strictly less than one
and it is positive if, and only if, second-period
actions are strategic substitutes.
Corollaries of Lemma 2 are that the strategic
effect of higher R&D hy one firm always low-
ers its own profits when spillovers are at their
maximum {0 = 1); while in the absence of
spillovers {0 = 0) it raise.s them in normal
Coumot competition and lowers them in nor-
mal Bertrand competition.
The first-order condition for R&D in a sym-
metric GCE may now be written as:
12) -— = y.uq - I = 0 , VI ,
n- \)a(0-0)]e.
Here, //^ (for "No-Cooperation GCE") de-
notes the marginal private retum to R&D per
unit output when firms behave strategically.^
We now wish to compare the FCE and GCB
^ Algebraically, p.'!'; could be negative if 0 is high and
a is large. (In homogeneous-product Coumot competi-
tion, this requires extremely convex demand.) Hencefor-
ward we rule out such cases and consider only inierior
equilibria in which R&D is positive.
equilibria. Clearly, at any given point /XG is
greater than 0 if, and only if, R&D spillovers
are sufficiently low; i.e., if, and only if, 0 is
less than the threshold value /?. But this result
is only a local one, which cannot directly be
extended to a comparison between two distinct
equilibria, since pa and 0 need not be constant.
Fortunately, a global comparison may be made
rigorously with some additional assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 3: Equilibrium of each type
is unique.
ASSUMPTION 4: The profit functions in ei-
ther one of the two regimes to be compared
exhibit the Seade stability condition with re-
spect to R&D levels at all points along HH
between the two equilibria.
The Seade stability condition (Jesus Seade,
1980) requires that the first-order condition for
optimal choice of R&D by a single firm be
decreasing in a uniform increase in R&D by
all firms: d'7v/0x,dx < 0. We can now rank
the levels of output and R&D in the two
equilibria:
PROPOSITION 1: With no R&D coopera-
tion and given As.sumptions 2, 3, and 4. output
and R&D are higher with strategic behavior
than without f i.e., in GCE than in FCE) if and
only if, the spillover parameter is less than the
threshold level 0 (where both (3 and 0 are
evaluated at the equilibrium corresponding to
the regime opposite to that specified in As-
sumption 4}.
This result generalizes the findings of Brander
and Spencer (1983) to allow for R&D spill-
overs: they showed that, in normal Cournot
competition with no spillovers, output and
R&D are higher when firms behave strategi-
cally. By contrast, o^r result shows that this is
only true {OT 0 < 0. h corollary is that it is
never true in normal Bertrand competition.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figures 1 to 3.
In each figure the F and G schedules reflect the
first-order conditions for R&D in FCE and
GCE, respectively, and their intersection
points with HH (A"' and -4"'') represent the
FCE and GCE equilibria, respectively. Stabil-
ity requires that F and G cut HH from below
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Private (/j,^ ) and social ( ^ retums to R&D
coincide: cooperation fully internalizes the ex-
ternality arising from R&D spillovers. How-
ever, this ignores any strategic motive. By
contrast, in GCE, each firm takes account of
the full effect of its choice of R&D on industry
profits. As in the case of no cooperation [(9)
above] this adds extra terms:
di:'
in Coumot competition and from above in
Bertrand competition, as shown. Figures 2 and
3 show that R&D and output arc lower (or,
equivalently, R&D is lower and price is
higher) when fimis behave strategically and 0
exceeds 0.
C. Effects of Strategic Behavior
with R&D Cooperation
Suppose now that firms cooperate in their
choice of R&D levels, though they continue
to compete at the second stage. Following
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we as-
sume that the cooperative level of R&D is cho-
sen to maximize joint profits, but that
cooperation does not affect the value of the
spillover parameter^. (The implications of re-
laxing this assumption are considered in Sec-
tion V, subsection C.) Once again, we must
distinguish between FCE, where firms commit
to both R&D levels and second-period actions,
and GCE, where R&D levels are chosen in the
anticipation of their strategic effects in the
second-period game.
Consider first the case of FCE. Cooperation
implies that the optimal level of R&D by each
firm maximizes industry profits PI = Z-ir':
, , , dU dTT(13) — ^ —
ux, ax,
- l )
= 0, Vi.
Using the results in the Appendix, this
becomes:
(15) ^ =
d
4) ^ I -\- (n
VI;
1.
V/;
The coefficient of ^ is less than unity: with co-
operation, the marginal retum to R&D is lower
in GCE than in FCE. Once again, we require
regularity conditions similar to those assumed in
Proposition 1 for this to hold globally:
PROPOSITION 2: Given Assumptions 2, 3,
and 4, then, when firms cooperate in their
choice of R&D, the levels of output and R&D
are lower with strategic behavior than without
(i.e., in GCE than in FCE).
D. Effects of R&D Cooperation
We can now consider the effects of cooper-
ation itself. The results of the last two subsec-
tions are summarized in Table 1, which gives
the marginal private retum to R&D in each of
the four equilibria, denoted by /i/, k = N, C;
l = F,G. Recalling that ^ is the social marginal
retum to R&D per unit output, we can see that
no cooperation with FCE and cooperation with
GCE lead to underinvestment in R&D, whereas
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no cooperation with GCE may lead to either
underinvestment or overinvestment. [The exact
condition for the latter is derived in (25) be-
low.I We have already compared the results
across columns in Table 1, and now wish to
compare across rows.
The first row suggests why cooperation is su-
perficially desirable: in FCE. it ensures that each
firm takes account of the effects of its R&D on
the costs of all other firms. Hence, with zero
spillovers it gives rise to the same equilibrium
and, with strietly positive spillovers, it leads to
higher output and R&D (provided again that the
regularity conditions hold). However, the GCE
comparison in the second row shows that this
conclusion is complicated by strategic behavior.
Comparing the two expressions at a given point,
we see that, when firms behave strategically
(i.e., in GCE), the marginal private retum to
R&D with cooperation, ^Q^ is greater than that
without, fj-a, if, and only if, P exceeds a new
threshold valued':
( 1 6 ) fj.'a-I^G = {n-
a + tp
Assuming that 4> is positive (so that a strategic
cooperati^'e has some incentive to engage in
R&D), P' lies strictly between zero and one.
(In the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin case of
homogeneous-product Cournot competition
with linear demand, both it and 0 equal 0.5.)
Finally, as in previous subsections we may ex-
tend this local comparison to a global com-
parison. Under the same regularity conditions
as before, we obtain:
PROPOSITION 3: Given Assumptions 2. 3,
and 4, then, when firms do not behave strate-
gically, cooperation leads to more output and
R&D, provided spillovers are strictly positive;
but when they do behave strategically, it leads
to less output and R&D unless spillovers are
sufficiently high that_f5 is greater than (3'
(where both 0 and 0' are evaluated at the
equilibrium corresponding to the regime op-
posite to that specified in Assumption 4).
Propositions 2 and 3 allow the equilibria with
R&D cooperation to be located in Figures 1 to
3. with both output (or price) and R&D levels
ranked by the locations of the corresponding
equilibria.''
E. Industry Profits
Having examined how different assump-
tions about strategic behavior and R&D co-
operation affect output and R&D, we turn to
evaluate the different equilibria from both pri-
vate and social perspectives. Consider first in-
dustry profits. Totally differentiating industry
profits in symmetric equilibria yields:
in- \)7r;]nda(17) dU =
Setting the coefficients of da and dx equal to
zero shows that a cartel, which seeks to max-
imize industry profits, ehooses output (or,
equivalently, price) such that marginal indus-
try profitability is zero; but for that level of
output it chooses the efficient level of R&D.
Moreover, we can draw iso-profit curves in (a,
x) space which are horizontal where they cross
the efficient R&D locus (along which ^q
equals V), and vertical where they cross the
cartel period-2 equilibrium locus (along which
TT', + {n — l)7rj equals zero). Two such
curves, centered on the cartel outcome A*', are
shown in Figures 4 and 5. The curve HH in
these diagrams, as in Figures 1 to 3, represents
the oligopoly equilibrium locus (i.e., the locus
of points at which the marginal profitability of
second-period actions is zero). The line MM
represents the cartel period-2 equilibrium lo-
cus (the locus of points which equate marginal
cost to industry marginal revenue), and must
lie below HH in Cournot competition and
above it in Bertrand competition. Finally, the
line R represents the efficient R&D locus, on
* A comprehensive list of the location of all four equi-
libria for intermediate values of p requires a comparison
of the values of ^ along the diagonals of Table I. E)etails
of this in the homogeneous-product Coumot case are
given in the Appendix to an earlier version of this paper,
Leahy and Neary (1995).
R
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FIGURE 4. ISO-PROFIT AND ISO-WEI.FARE Lfjci IN
COURNOT COMPRTITION
R
FIGURE 5. ISO-PROFIT AND ISO-WRLFARE LOCI IN
BERTRAND COMPETITION
which must lie both the cartel equilibrium A*'
and the nonstrategic cooperative equilibrium
A* '^. Changes in the spillover parameter shift
all the loci in Figures 4 and 5 but they do not
affect the qualitative relationships between the
loci shown in the diagram.
In order to rank the level of profits in the
different equilibria, we first need to establish
which of the oligopoly equilibria maximizes
industry profits. To do this, we use the period-
2 first-order condition, TT', = 0, and its slope,
(7), to simplify (17):
(18) i ^ = ( n -
n dx
From (15), this is the first-order condition for
R&D in the "Cooperation GCE" equilihrium.
Hence, we may conclude:
PROPOSITION 4: Across all oligopoly equi-
libria, industry profits are maximized when
R&D is chosen both cooperatively and
strategically.
To rank the levels of profits in other equilibria,
we must assume that industry profits are quasi-
concave in X along HH. If this holds, profits
fall monotonically as we move away from A "^  ^
in either direction along the HH locus, and the
rankings of equilibria given in Section II, sub-
section D, allow us to rank the levels of profits
by inspection of Figures 1 to 5.
F. Social Welfare
The result that R&D cooperation when
firms play strategically maximizes oligopoly
profits raises crucial questions about the policy
stance towards cooperation. However, before
considering these, we must examine the levels
of welfare. Following standard convention, we
measure welfare as the sum of consumer sur-
plus, H({ql) - i:p,q, (where the aggregate
utility function depends on the vector of quan-
tities {q 1), and industry profits, net of subsidy
payments:
(19) W(q,x) - «
-c(x)nq- n
As with industry profits, we differentiate this
totally, setting «, = p:
(20) dW ^  (p - c)nQ^.da
- r')ndx.
where Q^ = dqjda^ + (« - 1 )dqj/da, is pos-
itive (equal to one) in Coumot competition
and negative in Bertrand competition. Natu-
rally, first-order conditions for a welfare max-
VOL 87 NO. 4 LEAHY AND NEARY: R&D IN OLIGOPOUSTIC INDUSTRIES 651
imum are that price equal marginal cost and
that the marginal social retum to R&D equal
its marginal cost. Away from the optimum, we
can draw iso-welfare contours which are hor-
izontal where they cross the efficient R&D lo-
cus {where ^q equals F ' ) , and vertical where
they cross the p = c locus. The latter, denoted
WW in Figures 4 and 5, lies above the HH
locus in (q, x) space and below it in (p, x)
space, since the socially optimal level of out-
put exceeds the oligopoly level for a given
level of R&D. Two such iso-welfare curves,
centered on the social optimum A'^, are shown
in Figures 4 and 5.
As with profits, it is helpful to determine
where welfare is maximized along the HH lo-
cus. This is done by substituting from equation
(7) into (20) to obtain:
n dx
where: f/ = \ I + (p ~ c)
qA
y.^ is the social retum to R&D per unit output
at the second-best optimum. The coefficient
of ^ is greater than one, implying that for
given output the second-best optimum re-
quires overinvestment in R&D. Moreover, /z^
is greater than the marginal private return to
R&D per unit output in all of the four oli-
gopoly equilibria, with the possible excep-
tion of the "No-Cooperation GCE" case
when actions are strategic substitutes and
spillovers are low. [Equation (27) below
gives the exact condition.] As with earlier
results, these local comparisons imply glo-
bal rankings under appropriate regularity
conditions:
PROPOSITION 5: If actions are chosen non-
cooperatively, welfare is maximized when the
level of R&D is such that its marginal retum
per unit output equals /i^. Given Assumptions
2, 3. and 4, this second-best optimum has
higher levels of output and R&D than any of
the free-market oligopoly outcomes, except for
the "No-Cooperation GCE" equilibrium
when actions are strategic substitutes and 0 is
low.
Geometrically, the second-best optimum in
Figures 4 and 5 is the point of tangency ,4 ^ of
HH with the highest attainable iso-welfare lo-
cus. Moreover, provided the welfare function
is quasi-concave in .v along HH, we may rank
the welfare levels in different equilibria in
terms of their distance from A \ Inspection of
the diagrams shows that the ranking of the
equilibria with respect to welfare is almost ex-
actly the reverse of the ranking with respect to
profits when spillovers are low. By contrast,
when spillovers are high, the two rankings are
more similar. Keeping this in mind, we pro-
ceed to derive rules for optimal intervention in
the next section.
III. Attaining the First-Best Optimum
When we come to consider optimal inter-
vention, it is immediately obvious that R&D
policy alone cannot attain the first-best opti-
mum. With two targets to control (the levels
of output and R&D of the representative firm),
two instruments are required. If we assume
that the second instrument is an output sub-
sidy, its optimal value must be such that the
gap between price and marginal cost is elimi-
nated, i.e.,
(22) s'^ = bq>0.
where b is (the absolute value of) the slope
of the representative firm's inverse demand
function (equal to -dp,ldq, in Coumot com-
pefition and ( - dq, I dp,)"' in Bertrand com-
petition). This formula holds irrespective of
the order of moves of firms and govemment
and irrespective of whether firms cooperate on
R&D or not.
Turning to R&D policy, assume first that
the govemment can commit to the optimal
output subsidy before firms choose their
R&D. The optimal R&D policy then follows
immediately from the results of the last sec-
tion. With a subsidy, the profit-maximizing
condition for R&D in each of the four equi-
libria becomes:
(23) = N,C\
1 =
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TABLE 2—FIRST-BEST OPTIMAL SUBSIDIES TO R&D IN
DIFFERENT EQUILIBRIA
FCE
GCE
SE
(n -
No cooperation
on R&D
(t -9)q^0
i)ia+])(0-S-)O<,
a^- - 4,^'q ^ 0
Cooperaiion
on R&D
0
Notes: ^' = 0
a + \ dx,
where the marginal return to R&D per unit
output can be read from Table I. Since
the first-best optimum requires that the
marginal cost of R&D, f , equal its mar-
ginal social return ^q, the optimal R&D
subsidy must be:
(24) a^ = {^- = N,C;
1 = F,G.
The exact values of this expression in each of
the four equilibria are given in the first two
rows of Table 2. All are necessarily nonneg-
ative, except for cr^:
(25) IFF 0>0' ^
The threshold value of ^  is strictly positive if,
and only if, actions are strategic substitutes.
[Recall equation (11).] This imphes that, if
firms behave strategically but noncoopera-
tively and competition is normal Cournot,
R&D should be taxed if there are no spillovers.
However, the threshold is likely to be small: it
is always less than 0 in absolute value and it
is algebraically less than l / ( n + 1) in
homogeneous-product Coumot competition.
So there is always some level of spillovers
which justify subsidization and R&D should
always be subsidized in normal Bertrand com-
petition. Summarizing:
PROPOSITION 6: If the government can
commit to the optimal output subsidy, then
the optimal R&.D subsidy is nonnegative,
except in the "No-Cooperation GCE"
equilibrium when 0 < 0' (which requires
that actions are strategic substitutes and 0
is low).
We now wish to compare the values of the
subsidies in the different equilibria. Unlike
Propositions 1 to 5, sucb comparisons do not
require any regularity conditions. All the sub-
sidies are evaluated at the same point and so
their values may be compared directly. And,
since the optimal subsidies are directly related
to the marginal retums to R&D by equation
(24), comparison between tbem is straightfor-
ward. By applying the results of earlier sec-
tions, we may immediately state:
PROPOSITION 7: When firms do not co-
operate on their choice of' R&D, strategic
behavior implies a higher optimal subsidy if,
and only if, 0 > 0; when they do cooperate,
strategic behavior always implies a higher
optimal subsidy; cooperation without stra-
tegic behavior requires no subsidy; and,
given strategic behavior, cooperation re-
quires a higher subsidy than no cooperation
if and only if 0 < 0'.
How are these results affected if the gov-
emment cannot commit to an output subsidy,
the case we call Sequence Fquilibrium? Firms
now anticipate that the output subsidy will be
set by equation (22). ' But the right-hand side
of this depends on the levels of R&D. Hence,
firms have a strategic incentive to alter their
R&D in order to increase their output subsidy.
The govemment in tum, anticipating this in-
centive, should take it into account in setting
its R&D subsidy. Even though x is chosen be-
fore the output subsidy, the govemment can
still achieve the GCE optimum since it has two
instmments at its disposal and only two dis-
tinct targets, x and ^  (as in Leahy and Neary,
1994).
The resulting fully time-consistent optimal
subsidies are derived in the Appendix and
given in the third row of Table 2. We use the
^ As already noted, we confine attention to subgame
perfect equilibria. Cases where the govemment first an-
nounces the GCE output subsidy and then reneges are con-
sidered in a related model by Leahy and Neary (1996).
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parameter ^ ' to represent the derivative ofthe
optimal output subsidy s" witb respect to eacb
firm's level of R&D: ^ ' = dsVdx,. The pre-
cise form this takes depends on the details of
the second-period game. However, it is likely
to be positive, implying that the output subsidy
is a strategic complement for R&D. This is
because the optimal output subsidy depends on
the gap between marginal revenue and price;
since higher R&D reduces the latter (by low-
ering marginal cost which encourages an in-
crease in output) it can only lower the optimal
subsidy if it causes a more than compensating
fall in marginal revenue."* If ^ ' is positive,
there is an additional payoff to investment in
R&D, which mandates a lower value of the
R&D subsidy to restrain firms from this stra-
tegic overinvestment. With cooperation, both
the extra incentive and the necessary correc-
tive by the govemment are greater, depending
on « * ' rather than ^ ' . In both cases, with and
without R&D cooperation, the optimal sub-
sidy is lower in SE than in the corresponding
GCE case if, and only if, ^ ' is positive.
Summarizing:
PROPOSITION 8: If the govemment cannot
commit to an output subsidy, then the first-best
optimum can still be achieved. With or without
R&D cooperation, the optimal R&D subsidies
are unambiguously lower than with govem-
ment commitment if, and only if, ^' is positive,
implying that the output subsidy is a strategic
complement for R&D.
The optimal subsidies may be negative in
SE both with and without cooperation on
R&D.
IV. Optimal Second-Best Subsidies to R&D
Suppose now that it is not possible to sub-
sidize output.^ Welfare is related to R&D and
* For example, in homogeneous-product Coumol com-
petition, * ' equals (1 + r)£,/n^, where r equals/i^p"//>',
a measure of the concavity of the market demand curve.
Hence 4"' is positive except when demand is highly con-
vex. For a simitar result in tariff theory, see Brander and
Spencer (1984) and Ronald W. Jones (1987).
'' Suzumura (1992) also considers the possibility that out-
put subsidies are not feasible. However, he deals with it by
period-2 actions in tbe same way as before.
However, the only instrument now available
to the govemment is the R&D subsidy a. This
alters tbe incentive for investment in R&D but
cannot affect the period-2 first-order condi-
tion, 7r; = 0 . Hence the best outcome that pol-
icy can achieve is the second-best optimum,
where the marginal retum to R&D equals ^/q.
Combining (21) and (23), the R&D subsidy
which attains this outcome in each of the four
oligopoly equilibria is given by:
(26) ffJ = = N,C\
1 = F,G.
Since fi^ exceeds ^, it must also exceed each
of the /if, with the possible exception of
fie- The exact condition for the latter is as
follows:
(27) CT^ > 0 IFF 0> 0"
in - l)(a + \)0' -a'
in - 1 ) ( Q + I + a')
where: a' = ip — c) "." > 0.
The new threshold 0" must be negative if ac-
tions are strategic complements; while if they
are strategic substitutes it may still be negative
and must be less than 0', which we have al-
ready seen in Section III is likely to be small.
Summarizing:
PROPOSITION 9: The second-best optimal
subsidies to R&D are positive, except for the
"No-Cooperation GCE" equilibrium when
actions are strategic substitutes and 0 is low.
using what he calls a "Second-Best Welfare Function,"
defined as W^ix) = W[x, q(x)]. where q(x) is the so-
lution to the Coumot oligopoly output equilibrium con-
dition setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue.
Geometrically, this amounts to looking at values of wel-
fare along the HH locus in Figures 1 and 2. Suzumura"s
approach is equivalent to ours in a linear model. (See Sec-
tion V, subsection A.) In more general contexts, our ap-
proach has the advantage of permitting an exact
comparison of the subsidies in all four equilibria at the
same second-best optimal point.
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In addition, the rankings of the optimal sub-
sidies which held in the first-best optimum
continue to hold in the second-best optimum.
For completeness, we state this as follows:
PROPOSITION 10; The rankings of subsi-
dies given in Proposition 7 for the first-best
optimum also hold at the second-best
optimum.
Like Propositions 6 to 8, these two are com-
pletely general and do not require any regu-
larity conditions (though, of course, the
parameters must now be evaluated at tbe
second-best optimum itself). However, al-
though fl'' must exceed ^ at any given point,
we cannot compare the first- and second-best
R&D subsidies in the same manner. Nor can
we adapt the techniques used earlier, since As-
sumption 4 does not rule out the possibility
that the values of f^ at A" and A may differ
considerably. However, in the special linear
case of Section V, subsection A, below, when
these parameters as well as /i^ and ^ are all
constant, we can be sure that each second-best
optimal subsidy is greater than the correspond-
ing first-best optimal subsidy.
V. Linear Cournot Competition
and Cooperative Synergies
In this section, we explore the properties of
the model in more detail for special functional
forms and then discuss the consequences of
relaxing a key assumption.
A. Coumot Competition with Linear
Demands and Quadratic Costs of R&D
Consider the case of homogeneous-product
Coumot competition with linear demands, so
p = a - bQ, with a and b constant. On the
cost side, we assume that the marginal cost of
output is linear in R&D, so ( I ) becomes: C; =
C() - OiXi + 0X_,). withe,,, 9, and/5 constant.
In symmetric equilibria this simplifies to: c =
CQ — ^x., assumed nonnegative. As for the costs
of R&D itself, we assume they are quadratic:
n^:) = -yx^ll, with y constant.
Under these assumptions, the expressions
derived for the general case simplify consid-
erably: see the Appendix, Table AI. Compar-
isons between equilibria now depend on only
three parameters: the number of firms n\ the
spillover parameter 0; and a new parameter
measuring the relative effectiveness of R&D,
defined as T; = O^lby. Table Al helps resolve
some ambiguous results. For example, it
shows that the level of R&D at the second-
best optimum is always less than at the first-
best optimum. (Details are in the Appendix.)
It is also possibie to obtain a feel for the quan-
titative implications ofthe model with the help
of Figure 6. This illustrates the relationship
between welfare in each equilibrium (relative
to tbat in the social optimum) and the spill-
over parameter 0, assuming n = 2 and
7] = 0.4.
The first conclusion suggested by Figure 6
is that the level of welfare in the second-best
optimum closes only about half of the gap be-
tween the levels of welfare in the cartelized
equilibrium and the first-best optimum. To see
how robust this is. Figure 7 shows for different
values of n how (W^ - W^)/(W" - W^)
varies as a function of a composite parameter
X^ which depends positively on both the ef-
fectiveness of R&D 7] and the spillover param-
eter /?.'" As Figure 7 shows, with large
numbers of firms, welfare in the second-best
optimum is close to the first-best level, and so
R&D policy has the potential to close much of
the gap between the cartel and the first-best
levels. However, for highly concentrated in-
dustries (small n), R&D policy alone (in the
absence of competition policy) is at best a lim-
ited tool for improving market performance.
The potential effectiveness of R&D policy is
dramatically lower when R&D is highly effec-
tive and spillovers are high.
The second conclusion suggested by Figure
6 concems the benefits of cooperation. In the
absence of strategic behavior, cooperation
'" Comparisons between all the equilibria, such as those
in Figure 6, depend on three parameters, n. 0. and q. How-
ever, if we exclude equilibria in which R&D is chosen
noncooperatively, as in Figures 7 and 8, the comparisons
depend only on two parameters: n and x^- which equals
^-/nAy. or, altematively, {1 +(n- 1 )^l-T;/n. The range
for 0 in Figure 6 (0,0 to 1.0) corresponds to a range for
X^ in Figures 7 and 8 of 0.2 to 0.8. The explicit expres-
sions underlying Figures 7 and 8 are given in the
Appendix.
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Notes: These curves are exact for the case of Coumot competition with linear demand, quadratic costs of R&D, and i) =
0.4. Each curve shows, for n = 2, the level of welfare in the corresponding equilibrium relative to that at the social
optimum, as a function of the spillover parameter, 0.
greatly enhances market perfonnance: in FCE,
the cooperative equilibrium always leads to a
higher level of welfare than the noncoopera-
tive one and the gap is significant when spill-
overs are high. However, when firms behave
strategically, the superiority of cooperation is
much reduced. In GCE, cooperation leads to
higher welfare than no cooperation whenever
0 exceeds 0.5 (as we know from the theoreti-
cal results). But cooperation does not help that
much, leading for high spillovers to a level of
welfare only slightly higher than the cartel
level. Figure 8 shows that this result is robust:
except for cases with ineffective R&D, low
spillovers, and large numhers of firms, strate-
gic cooperation leads to welfare levels which
are not much better than the cartel level. Re-
calling from Proposition 4 that firms always
have an incentive to cooperate, this suggests
that the case for encouraging cooperation is
much weaker than previous studies suggest:
such encouragement is both limited in its po-
tential for raising welfare and likely to be re-
dundant in any case.
B. Stability of the Linear Model
It is necessary to check that any set of pa-
rameter values is consistent with stability.
The details of this are lengthy and are rele-
gated to the Appendix. In all cases, stability
is more likely the lower is r/, i.e., the higher
the cost of, and the lower the effectiveness
of, R&D. Heuristically, higher values of T]
impart an element of increasing returns to
the model, increasing the incentive for each
firm to deviate from the symmetric equilib-
rium. As for increases in P, they tend to en-
hance stability when firms do not cooperate
but to make it less likely when they do.
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FIGURE 7. MAXIMUM WELFARE GAIN FROM R&D POLICY ALONE
Notes: Same assumptions as Figure 6, except that rj and n are now variables. Each curve shows, for different levels of
n, the ratio of ( H " - W*') to ( H ' ' ' - W") as a function of x ' -
Instances of instability should be interpreted
as a failure of the assumptions of the model,
especially that of symmetry, requiring most
plausibly some entry or exit of firms from
the industry.
C. Cooperative Synergies
So far, we have assumed that the spillover
parameter 0 is unaffected by the decision to
cooperate. This is clearly unrealistic, and a
number of authors have considered the impli-
cations of allowing 0 to rise when cooperation
occurs, reflecting cooperative synergies."
Kamien et al. (1992) go so far as to describe
as an "R&D cartel" the type of cooperation
" See, forexample, Michael Katz (1986) and Massimo
Motta (1994), Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph
(1994) construct a model in which the spillover parameter
is endogenized.
which we have considered so far (in which 0
is unaffected), reserving the term "coopera-
tion" for the case where spillovers are com-
plete (^ = 1).
How are our results affected if R&D is sub-
ject to cooperative synergies? The first point
to note is that all our conclusions conceming
the effects of strategic behavior for a given de-
gree of cooperation are clearly unaffected.
Thus it remains true that strategic behavior
tends to reduce output, R&D, and welfare in
most cases, except the Brander-Spencer
benchmark case of strategic substitutes, low
spillovers, and no cooperation. Our conclu-
sions about the effects of cooperation itself
must be amended, of course. The expressions
given in Table 1 continue to hold, but com-
parisons across rows must allow for higher
values of 0, and hence of ^, when firms co-
operate on their R&D. This naturally tends to
make cooperation more attractive from a wel-
fare point of view. However, it also makes it
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FIGURE 8, WELFARE GAIN KRUM STRATEGIC CCKJPERATION ON R&D
Notes: Same assumptions as Figure 7. Each curve shows, for different levels of «, the ratio of (W^ - IV*') to
W) as a function of x ^
more privately profitable, reinforcing the view
that policy intervention to encourage cooper-
ation is likely to be redundant whether or not
it is desirable. Finally, the conclusions drawn
from the simulations of the linear case in Fig-
ure 6 also continue to hold for high (3, while
Figures 7 and 8 are unaffected by cooperative
synergies.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has considered a general model
of an oligopolistic industry, in which firms
first invest in R&D and then produce output.
Our objective has been to present a unified
treatment of a number of issues in order to
establish the principles which should govern
public intervention in industries where R&D
is important. In particular, we have sought
to disentangle the influences of strategic be-
havior and R&D cooperation on the levels of
output, R&D, and welfare; to compare the
private profitability and social performance
of different equilibria; and to calculate ex-
plicitly the optimal subsidies to output and
R&D under altemative assumptions. Since
our model allows for arbitrary numbers of
firms and general functional forms in both
output and price competition, it encom-
passes and generalizes earlier treatments of
this topic.
In comparing the levels of output, R&D,
profits, and welfare in different equilibria,
the paper makes three technical contribu-
tions. First, Propositions 1 to 3 and 5 make
global comparisons between these levels di-
rectly, subject to mildly restrictive regularity
conditions (essentially, that the Seade
[1980] stability condition hold along a path
between the two equilibria to be compared).
Second, Propositions 6 to 10 compare the
optimal subsidies wbich are required to at-
tain either the first-best optimum (wbere
both output and R&D subsidies can be used)
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or the second-best optimum (where only
R&D subsidies are available). These results
rely on local comparisons only and so need
far fewer qualifications than those of Prop-
ositions 1 to 3 and 5. Third, we show that
the difference between output and price
competition is not a crucial determinant of
the results. What matters is the extent of
R&D spillovers and whether firms' second-
period actions (outputs in Cournot compe-
tition, prices in Bertrand competition) are
strategic substitutes or complements.
Turning to our substantive contributions, we
have stressed the need to distinguish the im-
plications of strategic behavior on the one
hand from those of R&D cooperation on the
other. Concerning the former, our results show
that strategic behavior tends to reduce output,
R&D, and welfare and to mandate higher sub-
sidies in all cases except that considered by
Brander and Spencer (1983). The exception
is when firms choose their R&D levels non-
cooperatively, R&D spillovers are low and
firms' actions are strategic substitutes. In all
other cases, strategic behavior generates out-
comes which are unambiguously less desirable
from a social perspective.
As for R&D cooperation, its superficial at-
tractiveness is highlighted by the fact that it
unambiguously raises output, R&D, and wel-
fare (eliminating the need for any R&D sub-
sidy) when firms do not behave strategically.
However, with strategic behavior, cooperation
is less attractive: only when spillovers are high
does it raise welfare and so require a lower
subsidy.
Our results do not overturn the finding of
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin that R&D co-
operation is socially desirable when spill-
overs are high. However, they cast doubt on
both its relevance and its usefulness. The re-
sult is less relevant because industry profits
are always higher when firms choose their
R&D strategically and cooperatively. In-
deed, with higher spillovers, cooperation is
more attractive from both private and social
perspectives. So intervention to encourage
cooperation is likely to be least needed when
cooperation itself is socially desirable. As
for the usefulness of the result, with its im-
plication that R&D cooperation should be
encouraged (or facilitated by relaxing anti-
trust legislation), our simulations for the lin-
ear Cournot case suggest that the payoff
from doing so is likely to be low and that the
welfare cost of lax competition policy is
likely to be high.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
We give a stability proof for a more general case, which
is also useful in the section dealing with stability below. De-
fine \ and p as the derivatives of the marginal profitability of
firm ( with respect to its own action and to the action of any
other finn), respectively: \ = x,, and p = TT,,. From Dixit
[1986 equation (36-ii)], necessary conditions for st^ility in
a symmetric fi-firm oligopoly are that:
(Al) ( i ) \ < 0 and
Moreover, from Seade (1980 Theorem I ) . \ +
(n - 1 )p > 0 is sufficient for instability and so \ +
(n - l)p < 0 is necessary for stability, (We rule out
the knife-edge case \ + (n - \)p = 0. since conver-
gence to equilibrium will not occur,) Combining this
with (AI ) (i) gives a general necessary condition: \ <
Min{0, -(n - l)p]. And combining it with (Al ) ( i i )
when n is even gives: X, < Min {p, ~(n - \)p]. As for
sufficient conditions, Frank H. Hahn (1962) implies:
K < p < 0\ and Scade (1980 Appendix) implies:
|X| > (n - \)\p\. Combining these with (AI) (ii)
gives a general sufficient condition: \ < Min{p, -
(w - \)p]. Hence:
LEMMA A l : In asymmetric n-firm oligopoly model: ( i )
\< Min(O, - ( n - l ) p ) is always necessary for stability;
(ii) \ < M i n { ^ , -(n - \)p) is always sufficient; and
(iii) when n is even, \ < Min[p, -{n - i)p] is both
necessary and sufficient.
Corollaries of Lemma A! are that the Seade sufficient con-
dition: (a) is necessary when n = 2; but (b) does not nest
the Hahn condition when n > 2. Applying Lemma Al to
the period-2 game: \ - p < Oby Assumption 1 and X +
(n - \)p = - A, which gives Lemma 1,
Derivation of Equations 17) and (15) and Proofs of
Lemma 2 and Proposition 8
We begin by totally differentiating the period-2 first-
order condition of a typical finn i:
( A 2 ) n'.da.
+ (n - \ )-K',,da, + = 0, Vi.
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Al—LKVELSOF-" OUTPUT, R&D, AND WELFARE IN COURNOT COMPETITION
WITH LINEAR DEMANDS AND O"ADRATIC COSTS OF R&D
First-best opdmum
Cartel
Oligopoly
Output (q)
1 A
] - X' nb
1 A
2-x'nb
n
n + 1 - njix
A
nb
1
2
n -+
R&D
1
- X'
1
- X'
n
1 - n
nby
nby
pA
JiXnby
Welfare (W)
1 A-
-' ~ X A
(2 - x'f 2b
n{n + 2 — n/i") A~
(« + 1 - npixf 2b
Notes: A =a- c^; x = ?/v' (nby) = [ ! + ( « - 1)/3W (i?/"); A ^ /^ V (nhy) =
n); TJ = 9^/by. For each oligopoly equilibrium, the appropriate value of fi. the marginal
private retum to R&D per unit output, should be read from Table 1, with 7r,, = - 2b and
TTy = -b. andsoa = 4> = 2/(n + 1) and /3 = 0.5.
For the second-best optimum, the values of output, R&D. and welfare are given by ihe
corresponding formula for the oligopoly equilibria, with n set equal to fi'. Specializing the
general formula given in (21) to the linear case gives //' = (n + 2)^/(/i + 1).
TABLE A2—THRESHOLD VALUES OF J) CONSISTENT WITH STABILITY IN COURN(JT GCE WITH LINEAR DEMANDS AND
QUADRATIC COSTS OF R&D
Stability
condition
Threshold values of rj
Description Without cooperation With cooperation
- (n - l)p Necessary; necessary and
sufficient for /3 > 0.5
Sufficient; necessary and
\.< p sufficient for 0 < 0.5
and n even
X. < 0 Necessary; only relevant for
B < 0.5 and n odd
1)^
n + 1
2(1 - p)[n - (n -
2[n-{n-
211 + (n - I
fl + 1
2(1 - 0)l\ + in
(n + I)-
Consider now two shocks to a symmetric equilibrium. The
firsl is a uniform increase in R&D by each firm with no
govemment intervention; so dX., = in - \)dx,. da, =
da,, ds = 0, and firm subscripts and superscripts can be
suppressed. Solving (A2) in this case gives (7), the slope
of the HH schedule. The second shock, the subject of
Lemma 2, is an increase in R&D by firm i alone, so
dX., = 0. Now we need an additional equation, obtained
by totally differentiating the first-order condition of a typ-
ical firm 7 whose R&D does not increase:
Although this shock is asymmetric, the symmetry of the
initial equilibrium allows us lo set da^ = da^, TTJ, = it',,,
and 7rJ( = TT;^  = TY',, = TV,^. AS for ds, it equals zero in
Section II and, as discussed in Section III. ^'dx, in SE.
Solving equations (A2) and (A3) then yields:
(A4)
(A3) + n'jjda, + Tv',,da,
(n — q,,ds = 0, (A5)
k.
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FIGURE Al. MAXIMUM VALUES OF 77 CONSISTENT WITH STABILITY IN THE LINEAR (N-GCE) GAME: « = 3
Equation (A5) alone with * ' = 0 gives equation (10)
and Lemma 2; while equations (A4) and (A5) com-
bined with "I*' = 0 give equation (15), Repeating these
exercises with * ' nonzero gives the optimal subsidies
under SE in the third row of Table 2, Proposition 8
follows immediately.
Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 5
We give a general proof, which applies to all of these
propositions. In each case, we wish to compare two
equilibria: (x\ a') which satisfies ji'ix', a')q' -
r'(x'), the first-order condition for maximization of
n'ixi,- • • x„) with respect to x,; and (x~. a") which
satisfies fj,^(x-. a-)q- = V(x'), the firsl-order condi-
tion for maximization oi T!^{XI,- • • x„) with respect to
X,. Both equilibria lie along HH, so from Assumption
2, a and x are monotonically related: a = a(x); while
q equals a in Cournot equilibria and is monotonically
decreasing in a in (symmetric) Bertrand equilibria.
This allows us lo eliminate a and q, writing m(x) =
li[x. a(x)], q = q(x)and g(x} - T'{x).
T h e p r o b l e m m a y n o w b e s t a t e d c o m p a c t l y . G i v e n : t w o
first-order c o n d i t i o n s , (a) m'(x')q(x*) = g{x'); a n d ( b )
m^(x^)q(x^) = g(x'^); a local ranking of /I's at the first
equilibrium, ( c ) m'(x') > m^(x'); Assumption 3, ( d )
equilibrium of each type is unique; and Assumption 4 (the
Seade condition) holding for the profit function of the sec-
ond equilibrium, ( e ) d--K-ldx,dx < 0 at x \ x", and all
intermediate points; we wish to prove that J : ' > x^\ The
proof is immediate . From ( b ) , ( d ) , and ( e ) : m^(x)
q(x) < g(x) for all .r if, and only if, A: > X^ . But from ( a )
a n d ( c ) : m^{x')q{x') < g(x^). Hence jc' > x^.
The assumptions made do not rule out the possibility
of the local ranking of the /i's being reversed at the
second equilibrium: (f) m' {x') < m-{x'). However,
in that case. Assumption 4 cannot hold for the profit
function of the first equilibrium; i.e., O'-K '/dx, dx < 0
cannot hold. For, if it did, we would have from (a) and
(d) : m'(j:)^(jc) < g(j:) for all JT if, and only if, x > jt ' .
But, since x' > x'^, this implies that m'(x')q(x'') >
g(x-). From (b) , this in turn implies that m'(x^) >
m^(x^), which contradicts ( f ) .
Linear Demands and Quadratic Costs of R&D
Table Al gives the values of output, R&D, and welfare
under the assumptions of Section V, subsection A. The
results are most conveniently expressed in terms of two
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new parameters x and jl. which equal £, and p. respec-
tively, deflated by ^(nby). For each oligopoly equilib-
rium the appropriate value for ^ should be read from Table
I, with n;,, = -2b and TV,, = -h, and so a = i^  = 2 / ( H +
1) and ^ = 0,5,
From Table Al, R&D at the first-best optimum is
grealer than at any of the oligopoly equilibria if, and only
if, / / < ( « + I )^ln. This holds in all cases (including the
second-best opiimum) except lor f^*; when n > 2 and 0 is
low.
Figure 7 is based on ihe following expression:
(A6) W - W
W" - W'
1 —(« -I- 1)- - « ( ; i +
This equals 1 - 4/(« + 1)- at y ' = 0, rises very slightly
until il reaches its maximum value at x'~ = Mnin + 2),
and ihen falls monotonically to reach zero when x' itself
attains iis maximum permissible value of uniiy. Tlie ex-
pression underlying Figure 8 is:
1 ) ' + n ( n - \ ) ( n -
Like (A6). this equals I - 4/(n -I- 1)- at x ' = 0, It then
falls steadily (actually falling below zero for high x' when
n is grealer than 3) (o reach zero ax x~ = I•
Stability
With linear demands and quadratic costs of R&D, ihe
first-order condition for R&D in all cases is simply: ^.q -
yx = 0, where JJ and y are constants. To apply Lemma
A1 to the linear R&D game under GCE, differentiate this
with respecl to x,. and substitute from the linear versions
of(A4)and(A5):
(A8)
= -y +
(A9) p = dx.
dx,
n - (n - ])
b(n+ \)
I - 20
•IX— —».
b(n + 1)
Substituting the appropriate values of fi for the non-
cooperative and cooperative cases, we can calculate
threshold values for rj consistent with the stability con-
ditions. The results are given in Table A2 and are il-
lustrated for the noncooperative case wben n = 3 in
Figure Al- All of the lalter are increasing in 0. while
ihose for the cooperative case are decreasing in /?, ex-
cept lor the sufficient condiiion in ihe range /? E {tn -
2)/2(n - 1), 0,3 I, Finally. Ihc result of Henriques
( 1990) emerges as ii special case of ours: assuming
« - 2 and rj = I with no cooperauon gives a threshold
value for/J of (3 - v7)/2 = 0,177.
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